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I. 
Matheson Lake lies in the heart of a small wilderness area on Vancouver Island. For 
untold centuries it has been the home for a complex array of animals and plants. Loons, 
bald eagles, turkey vultures, ravens, northwestern crows, warblers, yellow pond lilies, 
cattails, Douglas-fir, lodgepole pine, arbutus, willow, snowberry, baldhip rose, salal, 
western painted turtles, red-legged frogs, snails, zooplankton, and phytoplankton - all of 
which have remained dynamically intertwined and interacting in an array of ecosystem 
communities, food webs, trophic levels, and nutrient cycles. Towards the more 
inaccessible end of the lake is a sheltered area, and it is there that the water often takes on 
a shimmering and mirror-like quality. Many times, I have looked into the water - at the 
algae, the beetles, the rough-skinned newts, and minnows - only to discover my own 
image, albeit one that is usually shadowlike and distorted. And then occasionally I have 
experienced those fleeting yet paradoxically timeless moments when the boundary 
between myself and the world has suddenly dissolved, and the lake and all its myriad 
creatures has become powerfully and indelibly incorporated into my own - into me - and 
the existence and fate of the animals and plants and insects have been felt as my own..1. 
But then, just as suddenly, as if implicit within the very act of attempting to understand 
the experience, the boundary between self and other is once more imposed, and I am cast 
again into the role of the proverbial prisoner in his cave of epistemological shadows: 
subject/object dualisms, and self/other projections. 
Throughout western literature, our descriptions of the natural world have reflected the 
values and biases of a given period in our history. Our perceptions of nature often tell us 
less about what is actually "out there" in the landscape, and more about the types of 
mental typography and projections that we carry about in our heads. It is natural, 
therefore that as values change, so too do our views regarding Nature. We might 
demonstrate this phenomenon with a number of examples from the past. 
One fascinating illustration of the way in which people have projected upon Nature their 
political and social biases is to be found in seventeenth century England. During the 
English Civil War the example of the beehive, with its queen, drones or "nobles," and its 
workers, was regularly employed by Stuart supporters to defend the concept of feudalism 
and social hierarchy. This tendency to project human values upon Nature and then use 
such values to lend support to a particular world view or social structure can again be 
witnessed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, for some, the natural 
hierarchy of the biological world legitimized British class structure. For a number of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers, such concepts as biological hierarchy 
and homeostasis were employed to validate and support those traditional values that were 
being eroded away in a rapidly expanding industrial world. 
Similarly, throughout this period, Darwin's biological concept of "the survival of the 
fittest" was utilized to advocate a host of social, economic and political activities. For 
example, while Herbert Spencer in Great Britain sought to apply Darwinian theory to all 
aspects of social and political life, in the United States Darwin's line of reasoning was 
frequently used to justify wholesale economic growth and industrial expansion by means 
of unrestricted competition - including in Commodore Vanderbilt's maxim, "the public be 
dammed!" Thus, the political economist, William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), related 
the process of natural selection to the development of a society in which the ruthless and 
the industrious rose to the top. 
While many persons were able to find in the processes of the natural world a justification 
for class privilege, cutthroat competition, and social Darwinism (the latter exemplified in 
the propaganda of German National Socialism), others were able to look to Nature for a 
wholly different set of social values. For example, in contrast to Darwin's "survival of the 
fittest" doctrine, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) carried on researches 
and found in the natural realm the endorsement of such values as "mutual aid," 
cooperation, and social synergy and harmony. Recently, this line of reasoning has been 
taken up by environmentalists, ecofeminists, and New Age advocates - all of whom find 
in their study of ecology the justification for the establishment of a new society based 
upon the values of unity and diversity (the recognition of "one world" and yet at the same 
time appreciation of the need for political and cultural decentralization), limits to growth, 
egalitarianism, and interdependence. And much along the lines of the Counter- 
Enlightenment and the Romantic writers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, a growing number of people are now perceiving in Nature a set of values 
which, in many ways is radically different from those that currently dominate our modern 
world. 
II. 
It is for this reason that ecology - at least in its "deep" or radical sense - has been labelled 
a "subversive" science. And while ecology is regularly employed by mechanistically 
inclined purveyors of reductionism, for many, it goes beyond the study of the 
relationships between organisms and their environments, and points in turn to a 
fundamentally new way of looking at our relationship to ourselves, to one another, and to 
the world. Indeed, ecology represents a wholly "new" type of consciousness that is 
emerging within the collective psyche of humankind. But while it is new, it is also 
perennial and timeless. It is a consciousness of synthesis, integration, and non-dualism, 
and as such is increasingly able to discern those corresponding values in the world about 
us. 
To endorse this perception of the world is to reject many of the dualistic assumptions 
(body/mind; human/nature; knowing subject/known object) that underlie our traditional 
world view. Instead, this new perception regards the whole of Nature as a complex but 
unified web of interdependent organisms, people, and events. It is the perception of the 
universe as an essential wholeness, but one which manifests itself in terms of countless 
diversities, expressions of behaviour, and life forms. And while this perception of the 
world does not in itself constitute a moral norm, an ecological interpretation of our place 
in Nature does allow us to describe and acknowledge many of the multi-relational 
consequences of our activities. Hence, this makes it easier for us to adopt an ethical 
stance which is more in keeping with the universe recognized and appreciated as a unified 
whole. For example, I am more likely to acknowledge a sense of responsibility towards 
my environment and other people if I am convinced that "self" and "other" are not 
isolated categories, but instead form parts of an interrelated continuum. For if we, as 
individuals, perceive ourselves to be inextricably linked to the rest of the planet - and 
indeed our solar system and beyond - we are much more likely to be drawn to an ethic 
which relates our own self-interest both to other human beings and to the environmental 
community of which each one of us is a part. In this regard, there is often a very strong 
relationship between the way the world is imagined to be and the types of behaviour and 
obligations people acknowledge and act upon. 
Consequently, an ecological view of the world lends itself to the adoption of a set of 
values in which the boundaries of our morality are increasing extended outwards from 
ourselves not only to include other humans and cultural traditions, but also to encompass 
non-human members of the earth's biotic community - animals, trees, plants, and 
ecosystems. Such a perspective implies a relationship to the biotic community that goes 
beyond its usefulness as an economic commodity and an object of exploitation. 
Yet ironically, we still find the majority of arguments for the protection of a natural area 
couched in - and therefore reflecting - the dominant economic and utilitarian values of 
our age. Hence, even for most conservationists the land is perceived as primarily an 
economic commodity to be exploited - albeit this time on a sustainable basis. In fact the 
very term "resource management" underscores the assumption that we are still somehow 
separate from Nature and that our knowledge of the world "our there" must be used in 
Baconian fashion to manipulate and master its objects for our own use. It is noteworthy 
that Gifford Pinchot, the original exponent of "wise management" conservation, had 
equated conservation with "sustainable exploitation" and made it abundantly clear that 
this was not to be confused with "preservation." Similarly, its latest incarnation in the 
form of "sustainable development" has come to be synonymous with "sustained economic 
development" - not with "developing sustainability." 
Consequently, we find arguments for the protection of wilderness areas usually couched 
in economic or utilitarian terms. For example, if a cost/benefit analysis of the region can 
demonstrate that its value lies primarily in recreation and tourism, then it may be worth 
saving. If, however, its chief value is to be found in forest products and mining, then, it 
goes. What is absurd here is to give a qualitative evaluation to something that cannot be 
measured solely on a monetary basis. Neil Evernden points out that this situation is much 
like saying that since the human body has been assessed at $12.98 in terms of that market 
value of its constituent parts, therefore that figure comprises its final worth..2. Yet we still 
continue to argue on behalf of Nature on such grounds, or at least in terms of some 
perceived use. Thus, we contend that wild areas must be protected because of their 
genetic worth or that we must protect the wolf population because of its value in weeding 
out the genetically inferior members of the deer and moose communities. The temperate 
rain forests of British Columbia are important for protecting the quality of our water, for 
climatic regulation, and as sinks for carbon dioxide - and so on. And while such 
arguments often prove to be expedient in terms of their accessibility to human self-
interest, it is not always easy to provide plausible economic or utilitarian "uses" for 
everything in Nature, and increasingly the justification for protecting snail darters and 
other such creatures becomes less and less convincing in terms of our traditional values. 
III. 
In the end, perhaps, the only justification for the careful protection of the land and life 
forms from total exploitation and final destruction is our recognition that they possess 
intrinsic value and worth. Indeed, as we begin to acknowledge our own implicit value and 
even essential divinity, we shall begin increasingly to perceive these same qualities in the 
world around us. For ultimately the quality of my relationship to other people and to 
Nature mirrors the relationship that I have to myself and the integration - or lack of 
integration - of my own psyche. And so, if we treat our bodies as objects or commodities, 
we shall tend to treat others and Nature in a similar fashion. If I have not acknowledged 
my own inner shadow, repressions, and fears, I will tend to project these upon others and 
the outside world. On the other hand, to the extent that I am able to affirm my own inner 
beauty, love, and wholeness, these qualities in turn will tend to be mirrored in my 
experience of the world. 
If the world "out there" mirrors my inner one, then in a very real way its transformation 
begins with the transformation of myself. If this is the case, I must be willing to take 
responsibility for what I experience. If, for example, I perceive or experience a world 
filled with poverty, injustice, and pain, it is because these attributes are also within me. 
However, as I begin to heal myself and express my own inner wholeness, I shall be able 
in turn to help transform the external world as well. 
It is not uncommon for a wilderness experience to act as a catalyst for an experience of 
one's own inner being and essential wholeness, and consequently for the experience of 
one's fundamental relatedness to, and inseparability from other life forms. Ultimately, it is 
in this experience of myself and therefore of my relatedness to the dragonflies, the birds, 
and the plants at such places as Matheson Lake that I recognize their intrinsic worth and 
need for protection. They are extensions of myself, and if they are hurt or lost, a part of 
me is also hurt or lost. 
Throughout history, people have journeyed into forests, the deserts, and the mountains 
and gained transpersonal experiences of one sort or another. It is in places such as these 
that we are less likely to be caught up in human conventions and readily definable social 
structures. Consequently, we are more apt to confront the contents of our psyches and 
acknowledge whatever may happen to lie within. More often than not, we will retreat into 
the security of our internalized social structures and categories, and project these upon the 
world about us. However, one may find that it is at those moments when we manage to 
suspend our internal judgements, authorities, and daily rules that we are also most open to 
all the transpersonal experiences of Being, of wholeness, and of merging participation 
with the universe. But this implies being willing to be vulnerable and open to the 
moment, without recourse to the normal securities of intellectual categorizations and 
comparative values. 
Traditionally, we have attempted to find security and order through the imposition of our 
own dualistic categories upon the world. As such, the form that our Western knowledge 
has taken has been predicated upon dualistic subject/object distinctions, and the 
"objectification" and control of other people as well as the natural environment. However, 
in the last years of the twentieth century, we are at a stage in history when - if only for 
our very survival - it becomes necessary to realize that our ultimate security lies not in the 
ongoing separation of ourselves from one another and the environment, and not in a 
consciousness based upon fragmentation and manipulation - but rather in the 
relinquishment of such thought patterns in favour of a consciousness of wholeness and 
integration, one that is necessarily grounded in Being itself. And so in order to step 
successfully into the future, we must find the courage to step first into the deepest 
recesses of ourselves. And perhaps significantly, the consciousness we shall be nurturing 
is already being reflected in outline form in our growing ecological perception of Nature 
and its awareness of the profound integration of ourselves with all manifestations of life. 
Notes 
1. One of the best descriptions to date of this type of "free flow" experience is to be found 
in John A. Livingston's The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart Ltd.), Chapters Four and Five. 
2. Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment, (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 10. 
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